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No. 20060593-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MOISES M. MORALES & LISA M. MORALES, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
Brief of Appellees 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
This matter comes within the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah 
Supreme Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (West 2004) because this 
is an appeal from a judgment of a court of record over which this Court does 
not have original appellate jurisdiction. On July 6, 2006, the matter was 
transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
Issues Presented 
1. Waiver 
The Plaintiffs' opening brief discusses only the dismissal of Moises 
Morales's claims. It does not contain any analysis of the dismissal of Lisa 
Morales's claims. Have Plaintiffs waived Lisa Morales's claim in its entirety? 
A. Standard of Review 
Generally, any issues "not presented in the opening brief are considered 
waived and will not be considered by the appellate court." Brown v. Glover, 
2000 UT 89,123, 16 P.3d 540. 
B. Preservation of the Issue 
This issue is unique to this appeal and does not require a review of the 
district court's decision. 
2. Compliance with the immunity act 
Although the State offered to settle part of Moises's claim, the parties 
never reached an agreement to settle the entire claim in the ninety days after 
Moises submitted his notice of claim. By operation of law, the claim was 
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deemed denied. The immunity act requires a plaintiff to bring suit within one 
year after the denial of a claim. This action was not brought until nineteen 
months after the claim was denied. Is the action barred by the immunity act? 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews the granting of a motion to dismiss for correctness, 
affording no deference to the district court. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,196 (Utah 1991). 
B. Preservation of the Issue 
This issue was raised in the State's motion to dismiss and 
accompanying memoranda. R. 6-37; 95-101. 
Determinative Constitutional 
Provisions, Statutes and Rules 
The following provisions are attached in Addendum 3: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 
3 
Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order of the district court granting the 
State's motion to dismiss under Utah's governmental immunity act. Plaintiffs 
brought this negligence action to recover damages sustained in an automobile 
accident. 
2. Course of the Proceedings Below 
Plaintiffs Moises Morales and Lisa Morales brought this negligence 
action against the State of Utah by filing a complaint on September 29, 2005. 
R. 1-5. Moises sought damages for injuries he sustained in an automobile 
accident. R. 2-4. Lisa, his wife, sought damages for loss of consortium. R. 2. 
The State filed a motion to dismiss, with supporting memorandum, 
based on the Utah governmental immunity act's one-year limitation on 
bringing suit. R. 6-37; 95-101. The district court granted the motion to 
dismiss, concluding that this action was barred because it was commenced 
well outside the immunity act's one-year limit. R. 113. The district court 
rejected the Morales's argument that the State was estopped from relying on 
the one-year limit, concluding that correspondence from the State's insurance 
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adjuster did not induce them to delay the filing of their lawsuit and did not 
lull them into a false sense of security. R. 112-13. The district court further 
concluded that Lisa Morales's claim was barred because she failed to file a 
notice of claim, a jurisdictional precondition to bringing suit. R. 112. 
The Moraleses then filed this appeal. R. 131. 
3. Disposition Below 
The district court entered a memorandum decision on May 22, 2006, 
granting the State's motion to dismiss and directing the State to prepare a 
final order. R. 111-16. The final order of dismissal was entered June 12, 2006. 
R. 120-22. 
Statement of Facts 
In 2003, Moises Morales was significantly injured when his motorcycle 
collided with a vehicle owned by the State of Utah and driven by a State 
employee. R. 5. 
On December 15, 2003, Mr. Morales properly filed a notice of claim with 
the State. R. 11-31. His wife, Lisa Morales, never filed a notice of claim. 
R. 8-9. 
On December 22, 2003, the State's insurance adjuster sent a letter to 
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the Morales's attorney. R. 49 (attached as Addendum 1). The letter 
acknowledged the attorney's representation of the Moraleses and stated: "We 
are continuing our investigation into this incident. Once our investigation is 
complete we will be in a position to make a firm decision on any coverage and 
liability issues." R. 49. The letter concluded by stating: "This letter does not 
constitute a waiver of any provisions or requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. . . nor does it confirm or verify the sufficiency of the 
claimant's notice of claim as required by the Act." R. 49. 
On May 22, 2004, the Morales's attorney sent a letter to the State's 
adjuster, asking whether the State's investigation was complete and whether 
the State had made a decision on liability and coverage. R. 46. 
On May 26, 2004, the adjuster responded with another letter. R. 44 
(attached as Addendum 2). The adjuster stated: "We are willing to consider 
any settlement offers you may present on behalf of your client." R. 44. He also 
offered to settle the property damage portion of the claim under the same 
terms he had previously offered before the Moraleses had retained counsel. 
R. 44. Regarding the bodily injury portion of the claim, however, the adjuster 
stated: "Once Mr. Morales reaches an appropriate stage in his recovery!,] I'd 
welcome obtaining any information you feel might help us in evaluating and 
settling his bodily injury claim." R. 44. This letter concluded, as did the first 
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letter, with this statement: "This letter does not constitute a waiver of any 
provisions or requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. . . nor does it 
confirm or verify the sufficiency of the claimant's notice of claim as required 
by the Act/' R. 44. 
After this May 26th letter, no other communication took place between 
the parties until this lawsuit was filed sixteen months later, on September 29, 
2005. R. 1-5. 
Summary of the Argument 
Lisa Morales's claim has been waived in its entirety because Plaintiffs' 
opening brief does not contain any discussion of the district court's dismissal 
of her claim. 
Moises Morales's claim was correctly dismissed by the district court 
because this action was not filed within the strict time limit in Utah's 
governmental immunity act. Moises points to no ambiguity in the immunity 
act that would relieve him of this strict time limit. In fact, the statute is clear 
that suit must be filed within one year of the denial of the claim. And 
although the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Davis v. Central Utah 
Counseling Center does not make it clear whether collateral estoppel can ever 
apply without ambiguity in the statutory language, Moises has failed 
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nevertheless to demonstrate that estoppel should apply in this case to relieve 
him of the one-year time limit. 
Because the district court correctly concluded that this action was 
untimely, this Court should affirm the district court's order of dismissal. 
Argument 
1. Lisa Morales's claim has been waived. 
Plaintiffs have waived Lisa Morales's claim in its entirety by failing to 
brief the issue. The argument in their opening brief is limited to only Moises 
Morales's claim and does not contain any discussion of the dismissal of Lisa 
Morales's claim. Generally, any issues "that were not presented in the 
opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the 
appellate court." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, H23, 16 P.3d 540. Accordingly, 
this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of Lisa Morales's claim. 
2. This action is untimely because it was not filed within a year of the 
State's denial of the claim. 
The Utah Supreme Court has "consistently and uniformly held that suit 
may not be brought against the state or its subdivisions unless the 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity act are strictly followed." Hall 
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u. Dep't ofCorrs., 2001 UT 34,123, 24 P.3d 958. Stringent enforcement is 
mandated because it is through the immunity act that the "legislature has 
recognized the necessity of immunity as essential to the protection of the 
state in rendering the many and ever increasing number of governmental 
services/" Id. at 114 (quoting Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976)). 
"Applying this rule of strict compliance, [the Utah Supreme Court has] 
repeatedly denied recourse to parties that have even slightly diverged from 
the exactness required by the Immunity Act." Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 
16, f 12, 40 P.3d 632. 
The immunity act's one-year statute of limitation bars this action 
because it was not timely filed. Moises's notice of claim was filed on December 
15, 2003, the date it was postmarked. R. 12. His claim was deemed denied 
ninety days later, on March 15, 2004, because it was neither denied nor 
approved. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14 (West 2004)1 (stating that a[a] claim 
shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety-day period the 
governmental entity or its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the ' 
claim"). After this deemed denial of his claim, the immunity act required that 
because the alleged injury here arose before July 1, 2004, this action is 
"governed by the provisions of Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act." 2004 Laws of Utah ch. 267, § 48. Accordingly, this brief cites 
to those provisions. 
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Moises bring his lawsuit within one year, or by March 15, 2005. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-15 (West 2004) (stating that a "claimant shall begin the 
action within one year after denial of the claim or within one year after the 
denial period specified in this chapter has expired"). Because this case was 
not initiated until September 29, 2005 - over seven months after the one-year 
deadline had passed - Moises's claim is barred by the plain language of the 
immunity act. See Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, SI SI 11 & 13, 67 
P.3d 466 (affirming trial court's dismissal of case that was filed outside the 
one-year limit); see also Wagner v. State, 2005 UT 54, SI 10, 122 P.3d 599 
(stating that courts look first to the immunity act's plain language and go no 
further unless the language is ambiguous). 
Moises should be held to strict compliance with the immunity act 
because he failed to demonstrate that any ambiguity in the act would relieve 
him of the act's strict requirements. In Davis v. Central Utah Counseling 
Center, the Utah Supreme Court recently held that an exception to strict 
compliance with the immunity act's provisions will be allowed only ain cases 
which depended upon ambiguities" in the act. 2006 UT 52, SI 44, 147 P.3d 390. 
Further, a plaintiff must "exercise the diligence necessary to effect strict 
compliance" with the act. Id. at SI 48. Where a plaintiff fails to exercise due 
diligence, the Court declined "to recognize an exception to the requirement of 
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strict compliance/' Id. Instead, "'where, as here, the statute is clear, readily 
available, and easily accessible by counsel, there is no reason to require 
anything less than strict compliance/" Id. at \ 49 (quoting Greene v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109, f 14, 37 P.3d 1156). Significantly, the Davis 
Court noted that even allegedly "intentionally misleading behavior" by the 
State that leads a plaintiff to fail to comply with the immunity act will not 
excuse strict compliance. Id. at 45 (quoting Greene at f 19). Although the 
adjuster's correspondence in this case is not even close to misleading, Moises 
would still be held to the strict one-year deadline even if the letters were 
misleading. 
Based on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Davis requiring 
ambiguity in the immunity act before a party is relieved of its obligation to 
strictly comply with the act's requirements, it is not clear whether the 
traditional estoppel test advanced by Moises applies to an unambiguous 
provision. But even if it does apply, Moises's estoppel argument fails for two 
reasons. First, he has failed to demonstrate that this case qualifies as an 
exception to the general rule that estoppel may not be invoked against a 
governmental entity. And, second, he has also failed to demonstrate that the 
elements of estoppel were present in this case. 
First, Moises's estoppel argument fails because he cannot demonstrate 
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that this case qualifies as an exception to the general rule that estoppel may 
not be invoked against a governmental entity. See Anderson v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992) (stating that, "[a]s a general rule, 
estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental entity"). A limited 
exception to this general rule applies "only if the facts may be found with 
such certainty and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity to invoke the 
exception/' Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moises's 
argument is based on the incorrect premise that the adjuster's 
correspondence amounted to an approval of his entire claim and therefore 
Moises was lulled into postponing suit. This premise is simply wrong because 
it grossly mischaracterizes the correspondence. 
As the district court correctly noted, the State adjuster's May 26th 
letter cannot be reasonably construed as an approval of the entire claim. The 
adjuster stated generally, regarding the entire claim: "We are willing to 
consider any settlement offers you may present on behalf of your client." R. 44 
(attached as Addendum 2). He then renewed a previous offer to settle the 
property damage portion of the claim: "I believe it would be appropriate to 
conclude the property damage portion of the claim as soon as possible. I'd be 
willing to resolve that portion of the claim as outlined [previously!." R. 44 
(emphasis added). But then the adjuster expressly left open the bodily injury 
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portion of the claim: "I'd welcome obtaining any information you feel might 
help us in evaluating and settling his bodily injury claim." R. 44. The adjuster 
also stated, as he had done in his previous letter, that none of the 
requirements of the immunity act were waived. And he even pointed counsel 
to the sections of Utah Code where the immunity act was located. 
Significantly, the offer to settle the property damage portion of the claim 
came without an admission of liability and without an explanation of the 
reasons behind the settlement offer. It was simply an offer to settle one 
portion of the claim, not an acceptance of the entire claim.2 
Because the most significant portion of the claim was still unresolved, it 
was unreasonable for Moises to not file suit in the nearly ten months he had 
remaining before the one-year deadline passed. Because the adjuster's 
correspondence clearly communicated without deception that the bodily 
injury portion of the claim remained unresolved, any injustice worked on 
Moises by not being able to litigate his claim is not due to the State's conduct. 
Where the immunity act's requirements are clear, "it is really those parties 
2If, as Moises suggests, the May 26th letter was an approval of the 
entire claim, then the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case since 
the immunity act allows suit to be brought only after denial of a claim. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15(1) (West 2004) (stating that "[i}f the claim is 
denied, a claimant may institute an action in district court"). The act does not 
authorize a suit for approved claims. 
13 
who fail to follow the express provisions of the statute correctly that prevent 
justice, not the strict compliance rule." Wheeler\ 2002 UT 16, \ 12. Therefore, 
this case does not qualify as an exception to the general rule that estoppel 
may not be invoked against the State. 
Second, Moises's estoppel argument fails because he cannot 
demonstrate that the elements of estoppel are satisfied. Those elements are: 
(a) "a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one 
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted"; 
(b) "reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken 
or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement"; and 
(c) "injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act." 
CECO u. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989). 
Because the May 26th letter was not an approval of Moises's claim, the 
State's position now that the claim was deemed denied is not inconsistent 
with any prior position. The first element is therefore not met. 
Nor is the second element met. Moises's inaction was unreasonable. He 
should have filed his suit within the year when bodily injury portion of the 
claim was clearly unresolved. His inaction was even more unreasonable since 
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he was represented by counsel who was not only charged with a full 
knowledge of the strict requirements of the immunity act but was expressly 
told that none of the immunity act's requirements were waived. The State did 
not lull Moises into inaction because: (1) the correspondence from the State's 
insurance adjuster could not reasonably be construed as an approval of the 
claim; (2) Moises was represented by counsel who was charged with an 
understanding of the plain requirements of the immunity act; and (3) the 
correspondence contained an express statement that none of the provisions of 
the immunity act were waived. Nevertheless, even if the State lulled Moises 
into delaying suit, the Utah Supreme Court has upheld dismissal of a suit for 
noncompliance in spite of the State's allegedly misleading conduct. Greene, 
2001 UT 109 at ff 17-19. 
The case law cited by Moises does not support his estoppel argument. 
Unlike Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969), the adjuster 
here never promised full compensation for the Moises's injuries, either one 
time or several. And unlike Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp., 522 P.2d 1252 
(Utah 1974), the State here never admitted liability. The offer to settle the 
property damage portion of the claim came without an admission of liability 
and without an explanation of the motivations behind the settlement offer. 
And, contrary to the facts of Whitaker, the adjuster here never promised that 
15 
a settlement offer would be forthcoming. Instead, he indicated that he 
welcomed any settlement demand Moises might be inclined to make. R. 44. 
Conclusion 
Because Plaintiffs' opening brief contains no discussion of Lisa 
Morales's claim, that claim has been waived on appeal. The district court 
correctly dismissed Moises Morales's claim because he failed to bring this 
action within the immunity act's strict one-year limitations period. Because 
the statute is unambiguous, Moises should not be relieved from this time 
limit. Although it is not clear after Davis whether collateral estoppel can ever 
apply without statutory ambiguity, Moises has failed, in any event, to 
demonstrate that estoppel should apply. Accordingly, the district court 
properly concluded that this action was untimely under the immunity act, 
and the State asks this Court should affirm the district court's order of 
dismissal. 
Dated this J_ day of May, 2007. 
J. CLIFFORD PETERSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for the State of Utah 
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Certificate of Service 
This is to certify that I mailed TWO copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee to the following this V"7^ day of May, 2007: 
Michael P. Studebaker 
Law Offices of Michael Studebaker, LLC 
2550 Washington Blvd., Suite 331 




Letter from State adjuster dated December 22, 2003 
(R. 49) 
1 Department of Administrative Services 
j Division of Risk Management Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor < 
S. Camille Anthony ! 
Executive Director \ 
Alan Edwards | 5120 State Office Building • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Risk Manager i (801) 538-9560 • FAX (801) 538-9597 • www.nsk utah.gov 
December 22, 2003 
Jose A. Loayza Esq. 
7321 South State Street, Suite A 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Re: Letter of Representation- Moises Morales Our file #45453 
Dear Mr. Loayza: 
This letter will acknowledge receipt of your letter of representation on behalf of Mr. 
Morales in this matter. I appreciate your letter and look forward to working with you and 
your client toward a resolution of this matter. 
We are continuing our investigation into this incident. Once our investigation is complete 
we will be in a position to make a firm decision on any coverage and liability issues. 
With regard to your question regarding liability policy limits, The State of Utah's liability 
limits are clearly outlined in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Please feel free to contact me directly if you have any questions or concerns. 1 can be 
reached at 801-538-9560 during business hours. 
This letter does not constitute a waiver of any provisions or requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-1 et seq, nor does it confirm or 







Letter from State adjuster dated May 26, 2004 
(R. 44) 
•--if 





DepartL of Administrative Services 
S CAMILLB ANTHONY 
Executive Director 
Division of Risk Management 
ALAN EDWARDS 
Dire i lor 
Jose A. Loayza Esq. 
7321 South State Street, Suite A 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
May 26, 2004 
RE: Your Client: Moises Morales 
Our File #45453 
Date of Loss: 10/12/03 
Dear Mr. Loayza, 
Thank you for your recent letter updating me on your client's condition. I'm glad he is 
continuing to do better. 
We are willing to consider any settlement offers you may present on behalf of your client. 
I believe it would be appropriate to conclude the property damage portion of the claim as 
soon as possible. I'd be willing to resolve that portion of the claim as outlined in my letter 
to your client on November 13, 2003. Of course the date of that letter is prior to your 
Letter of Representation dated December 4, 2003. If you,or your client do not have a 
copy of that settlement offer, please advise and I'll forward another copy to you for your 
consideration. 
Once Mr. Morales reaches an appropriate stage in his recovery I'd welcome obtaining 
any information you feel might help us in evaluating and settling his bodily injury claim. 
I look forward to working with you to resolve these matters. I can be reached at 801-
538-9560 during business hours. 
This letter does not constitute a waiver of any provisions or requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. 63-30-1 et seq, nor does it confirm or 




5120 Slate Office Building. Salt Lake City, Utah 84! 14 • telephone 801-5^8-9560 • lacsimile 801-538-9597 • www.risk utah gov Utah! 




§ 63-30-11. Claim for injury—Notice—Con-
tents—Service—Legal disability—Appointment 
of guardian ad litem 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limita-
tions that would apply if the claim were against 
a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injur}' 
against a governmental entity, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring dur-
ing the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color 
of authority shall file a written notice of claim 
with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving 
rise to the claim is characterized as governmen-
tal. 
(3)(a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so 
far as they are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or 
that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal 
guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim 
is against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is 
against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business adminis-
trator of the board, when the claim is against a 
school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, 
when the claim is against a special district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is 
against the State of Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the 
executive director, or executive secretary, when 
the claim is against any other public board, 
commission, or body. 
(4)(a) If the claimant is under the age of 
majority, or mentally incompetent and without 
a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the 
claimant may apply to the court to extend the 
time for service of notice of claim. 
(b)(i) After hearing and notice to the govern-
mental entity, the court may extend the time for 
service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that 
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an 
extension, the court shall consider whether the 
delay in serving the notice of claim will substan-
tially prejudice the governmental entity in main-
taining its defense on the merits. 
(d)(i) If an injury that may reasonably be ex-
pected to result in a claim against a governmen-
tal entity is sustained by a potential claimant 
described in Subsection (4)(a), that government 
entity may file a request with the court for the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem for the 
potential claimant. 
(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed undei 
this Subsection (4)(d), the time for filing a claim 
under Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 begins 
when the order appointing the guardian is is-
sued. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 11; Laws 1978, c. 27, 
§ 5; Laws 1983, c. 131, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 75, 
§ 4; Laws 1991, c. 76, § 6; Laws 1998, c. 164, 
§ 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 157, § 1, 
eff. July 1,2001. 
See, now, § 63-30d-401. 
§ 63-30-12. Claim against state or its employ-
ee—Time for filing notice 
A claim against the state, or against its em-
ployee for an act or omission occurring during 
the performance of the employee's duties, with-
in the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the attorney general within one year 
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of 
any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized 
as governmental. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 12; Laws 1978, c. 27, 
§ 6; Laws 1983, c. 131, § 2; Laws 1987, c. 75, 
§ 5; Laws 1998, c. 164, § 2, eff. May 4, 1998. 
See, now, § 63-30d-402. 
§ 63-30-13. Claim against political subdivi-
sion or its employee—Time for filing notice 
A claim against a political subdivision, or 
against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the em-
ployee's duties, within the scope of employment, 
or iunder color of authority, is barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the governing body 
of the political subdivision according to the re-
quirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year 
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of 
any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized 
as governmental. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 13; Laws 1978, c. 27, 
§ 7; Laws 1983, c. 131, § 3; Laws 1987, c. 75, 
§ 6; Laws 1998, c. 164, § 3, eff. May 4, 1998; 
See, now, § 63-30d-402. 
§ 63-30-14. Claim for injury—Approval or 
denial by governmental entity or insurance car-
rier within ninety days 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the 
governmental entity or its insurance carrier 
shall act thereon and notify the claimant in 
writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall 
be deemed to have been denied if at the end of 
the ninety-day period the governmental entity or 
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its insurance carrier has failed to approve or 
deny the claim. 
Laws J 965, c. 139, § 14. 
See, now, § 63-30d-403. 
§ 63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury—Au-
thority and time for filing action against gov-
ernmental entity 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may 
institute an action in the district court against 
the governmental entity or an employee of the 
entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within 
one year after denial of the claim or within one 
year after the denial period specified in this 
chapter has expired, regardless of whether or 
not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 15; Laws 1983, c. 129, 
§ 6; Laws 1985, c. 82, § 2; Laws 1987, c. 75, 
§ 7 . 
See, now, § 63-30d-403. 
§ 63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts 
over actions—Application of Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 
(1) The district courts shall have exclusive 
original jurisdiction over any action brought 
under this chapter. 
(2) An action brought under this chapter may 
not be tried as a small claims action and shall 
be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to the extent they are consistent with this 
chapter. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 16; Laws 1983, c. 1*29, 
§ 7; Laws 1999, c. 166, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999. 
See, now, §§ 63-30d-501 and 63-30d-601. 
§ 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 7 . Venue of actions 
Actions against the state may be brought in 
the county in which the claim arose or in Salt 
Lake County. Actions against a county may be 
brought in the county in which the claim arose, 
or in the defendant county, or, upon leave 
granted by a district court judge of the defen-
dant county, in any county contiguous to the 
defendant county. Leave may be granted ex 
parte. Actions against all other political subdi-
visions including cities and towns, shall be 
brought in the county in which the political 
subdivision is located or in the county in which 
the claim arose. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 17; Laws 1983, c. 129, 
§ 8 . 
See, now, § 63-30d-502. 
§ 63-30-18. Compromise and settlement of 
actions 
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring 
with its legal officer or other legal counsel if it 
does not have a legal officer, may compromise 
and settle any action as to the damages or other 
relief sought. 
(2) The risk manager in the Department of 
Administrative Services may: 
(a) compromise and settle any claim of 
$25,000 or less in damages filed against the 
state for which the Risk Management Fund may 
be liable; 
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney gen-
eral or his representative and the executive di-
rector of the Department of Administrative Ser-
vices, compromise and settle any claim of 
$25,000 to $100,000 in damages for which the 
Risk Management Fund may be liable; and 
(3) The risk manager shall comply with pro-
cedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 
38b, in compromising and settling any claim of 
$100,000 or more. 
See, now, § 63-30d-602. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 18; Laws 1981, c. 250, 
§ 6; Laws 1983, c. 303, § 2; Laws 1983, c. 320, 
§ 54; Laws 1990, c. 97, § 9; Laws 1995, c. 313, 
§ 1, eff. May 1, 1995. 
§ 63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff 
in action 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff 
shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the 
court, but in no case less than the sum of $300, 
conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of 
taxable costs incurred by the governmental enti-
ty in the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute 
the action or fails to recover judgment. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 19. 
See, now, § 63-30d-60J. 
§ 63-30-20. Judgment against governmental 
entity bars action against employee 
Judgment against a governmental entity in an 
action brought under this act shall constitute a 
complete bar to any action by the claimant, by 
reason of the same subject matter, against the 
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the 
claim. 
Laws 1965, c. 139, § 20. 
See, now, § 63-30d-202. 
§ 63-30-21. Repealed by Laws 1978, c. 27, 
§ 12 
§ 63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages 
prohibited—Governmental entity exempt from 
execution, attachment, or garnishment 
(l)(a) No judgment may be rendered against 
the governmental entity for exemplary or puni-
tive damages. 
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or por-
tion of any judgment entered against a state 
employee in the employee's personal capacity 
even if the judgment is for or includes exempla-
ry or punitive damages if the state would be 
